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I. INTRODUCTION
Contract law uses three measures of damages. The expectationmeasure puts the injured party in as good a position as if the contracthad been performed (i.e., not breached).' The reliance measure putsthe injured party in as good a position as if the contract had not beenmade.2 The restitution measure restores to the injured party any ben-efit the breaching party obtained from his breach at the injured
party's expense. 3
Although the expectation measure has always been the norm,4 LonL. Fuller and William R. Perdue, Jr. famously questioned its primarystatus in an article that appeared in 1936.5 They began by assertingthat each of the measures compensates the injured party for the lossof an associated "interest" in the contract-the expectation measurecompensates for the loss of the "expectation interest," the reliancemeasure compensates for the loss of the "reliance interest," etc. Theythen ranked these "interests" in what they considered to be the orderof their importance, putting the restitution interest first and the ex-pectation interest last:
It is obvious that the three "interests" we have distinguished do not presentequal claims to judicial intervention.... The "restitution interest," involving acombination of unjust impoverishment with unjust gain, presents the strong-est case for relief. If, following Aristotle, we regard the purpose of justice asthe maintenance of an equilibrium of goods among members of society, therestitution interest presents twice as strong a claim to judicial intervention asthe reliance interest, since ifA not only causes B to lose one unit but appropri-
1. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.8 (3d ed. 1999).
2. Id. § 12.1.
3. Id.
4. Id. § 12.8.5. L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages(pts. 1 & 2), 46 YALE L.J. 52, 373 (1936-37). Relevant excerpts of Part I are re-printed in the Appendix.
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ates that unit to himself, the resulting discrepancy between A and B is not one
unit but two.
On the other hand, the promisee who has actually relied on the promise,
even though he may not thereby have enriched the promisor, certainly
presents a more pressing case for relief than the promisee who merely de-
mands satisfaction for his disappointment in not getting what was promised
him. In passing from compensation for change of position to compensation for
loss of expectancy we pass, to use Aristotle's terms again, from the realm of
corrective justice to that of distributive justice. The law no longer seeks
merely to heal a disturbed status quo, but to bring into being a new situation.
It ceases to act defensively or restoratively, and assumed [sic] a more active
role. With the transition, the justification for legal relief loses its self-evident
quality. It is as a matter of fact no easy thing to explain why the normal rule
of contract recovery should be that which measures damages by the value of
the promised performance.
6
After thus concluding that "it is. . . no easy thing" to explain why
the expectation measure is the norm, they went on to explore what the
reason or reasons might be. They eventually concluded that although
there were no good reasons for protecting the expectation interest,
7
there was a good reason for using the expectation measure of damages
as the norm: because, they claimed, it generally results in the same
recovery as the reliance measure would and is easier to prove.
8
The Fuller and Perdue article and its "three interests thesis" has
had an immense scholarly and academic influence in the United
States. Richard Craswell cited over sixty publications treating the
three interests thesis in his article on the subject published in 2000.
9
A recent Lexis search of the "Law Reviews, Combined" database re-
vealed twenty-six citations to the article within the last two years.
10
The effect of the article has been to throw the question of the proper
measure of damages into doubt. Although it has been convincingly
shown that the article's conclusion is incorrect-that the expectation
measure generally results in the same recovery as the reliance mea-
sure would"-so that the article's further conclusion that the expec-
tation measure generally makes a good surrogate for the reliance
measure is wrong, no one has yet come up with any other generally
accepted reason or reasons for the expectation measure being the
norm. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states the three inter-
ests thesis almost verbatim as Fuller and Perdue stated it and offers
6. Id. at 56-57.
7. Id. at 57-60.
8. Id. 60-62.
9. Richard Craswell, Against Fuller and Perdue, 67 U. CH. L. REv. 99, 105-21(2000).
10. The search was conducted by Paul Kroeger, a student at the author's law school,
on May 31, 2001.
11. See, e.g., WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES 153-54 (1958); Melvin
Aron Eisenberg & Robert Cooter, Damages for Breach of Contract, 73 CAL. L.
REV. 1434, 1445-49 (1985).
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no reasons for preferring any one of the measures over the othertwo.12 No hornbook, treatise or casebook in print offers any such rea-
sons either, and nearly all of them mention the Fuller and Perdue ar-
ticle and comment upon it favorably.13
Despite its immense scholarly and academic influence, however,the article and its thesis have had no discernible effect on the law.The expectation measure continues to be the norm, 14 and even in the
situations for which the contracts restatements have explicitly sug-gested a flexible approach to damages, the courts continue to use the
expectation measure almost exclusively of the other two. 15
As demonstrated below, the courts have rightfully used the expec-tation measure to the near exclusion of the other two measures. To-
ward that end, Part II of this Article sets forth the principalinstitutions in a modern market economy in which contracts are used.Part III refutes the Fuller and Perdue three interests thesis by ex-plaining how the expectation measure meets the needs of these princi-pal institutions in four crucial respects, while showing that neither ofthe other measures meets these needs in even one such respect. PartIV exposes further endemic weaknesses in the three interests thesis.Part V concludes by showing that the three interests thesis is tooflawed to be of use for comparing the merits of the three damages
measures.
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (1981) (Purposes of Remedies)
states:
Judicial remedies under the rules stated in this Restatement serve toprotect one or more of the following interests of the promisee:(a) his "expectation interest," which is his interest in having the benefit
of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would have been inhad the contract been performed,
(b) his "reliance interest," which is his interest in being reimbursed forloss caused by reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position
as he would have been in had the contract not been made, or(c) his "restitution interest," which is his interest in having restored tohim any benefit that he has conferred on the other party.13. See, e.g., JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 14.4(4th ed. 1998) (hornbook); CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW960-61 (4th ed. 1999) (casebook).
14. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 12.8.
15. See, e.g., W. David Slawson, The Role of Reliance in Contract Damages, 76 COR-NELL L. REV. 197 (1990) (concluding that despite the urging in both the Restate-
ment (First) of Contracts section 90 and Restatement (Second) of Contracts section90 to take a more flexible approach, the courts, without exception, have used theexpectation measure whenever they could for breaches of contracts made enforce-
able by detrimental reliance rather than by consideration).
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II. THE PRINCIPAL INSTITUTIONS IN A MODERN MARKET
ECONOMY IN WHICH CONTRACTS ARE USED
Almost every purchase and sale in a modern market economy in-
volves a contract, even if the contract sometimes only consists of im-
plied warranties. (By a "market economy" I mean an economy in
which the dominant means of doing business is for sellers to compete
with one another in largely unregulated markets.) I will deem a
purchase and sale to have occurred in an economic market if the pur-
chaser had a choice of whom to purchase from, because the availabil-
ity of such a choice is the essential condition for the existence of
competition. A purchaser nearly always has such a choice in a modern
market economy. The economic market is one of the two principal in-
stitutions in which contracts are used.
The other is the institution of credit and finance. Contracts in this
context are the things which are bought and sold as well as the usual
means of buying and selling them. Stocks and bonds are contracts, for
example. Although there are numerous kinds of contracts that are not
typically used in either of these institutions, these two are so impor-
tant to the functioning of a modern market economy that if contracts
did not meet their needs, the economy could not function.
A. The Institution of the Economic Market: Contracts as
Bargains
Every developed country in the world has a market economy. The
few socialist economies still left are in or near collapse. Economic
markets operate through bargains and could not operate without
them. There is a bargain every time anything is bought and sold.
Contracts are promises the law will enforce,
16 and promises made en-
forceable by consideration are bargains. The consideration and the
promise or promises it supports are the two sides of the bargain. Al-
though not all bargains are contracts, because not all of them include
promises, bargains must be contracts if any part of one party's per-
formance is to come after any part of the other's. Bargains in which at
least one party is to render services must therefore be contracts, for
example, because the performance of services inevitably takes time.
Either the payment for the services must come before the services are
performed, or the services must be performed before they are paid for.
Once the industrial revolution began, even most bargains for the sale
of goods had to be contracts, because goods then began to be produced
far from where they would be used, and buyers and sellers therefore
had to deal with each other over long distances. Either the buyer had
to pay for the goods before he received them, or the seller had to de-
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981) (Contract Defined).
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liver the goods before he was paid for them.17 Therefore, since theindustrial revolution, one can say the same of contracts as one couldpreviously have said only about bargains: economic markets operate
through contracts and could not operate without them.
Markets are important because, as Adam Smith so famously put it,they are the "invisible hand" by which individual gain is made to servethe public good.18 Contracts are both the means by which marketsharness the individual gain and the means by which the individualgain is made to serve the public good. Both parties must expect togain from a contract or they would not make it. In the large majority
of instances, both parties do gain, even if not quite as much as theyhad hoped. For example, a lawyer contracts with a painter to paintthe lawyer's house. The house will be better painted than if the law-yer painted it herself, and the lawyer will work many fewer hours ather job as a lawyer to earn the money to pay the painter than it wouldtake her to paint the house herself. The painter will work many fewerhours painting the house than he would need to work to do or makethe things for which he spends the money he will earn from painting
the house. Both parties will gain even more from the contract thepainter makes with the seller of the paint, because the paint will bethe product of centuries of technological and organizational progress,
which would be impossible for either the painter or the lawyer to have
done themselves.
Markets make the individual gain serve the public good by en-gendering economic competition. The sellers whose goods the buyerslike the most make the most profits and therefore prosper and expand,
while the sellers who fail to offer goods that buyers like eventuallydisappear. Sellers are thereby encouraged to improve their goods andto lower the costs of producing them, both of which increase the publicgood. Contracts play essential roles in this process both in the obvious
sense that markets could not function without them, because everypurchase and sale is a contract, and in the not-so-obvious sense thatthey are the links in the chains by which large numbers of individualsbind themselves together in the cooperative efforts that improve goods
and lower the costs of producing them. The links in the chains by
which individuals are organized into firms, the links in the chains by
which firms distribute and sell what they produce, and the links in the
chains that bind firms to their suppliers and all the other firms with
which they interact, are all contracts. Adam Smith also pointed this
out.19
17. W. DAVID SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES: THE LATE 2 0TH CENTURY REFORMATION
OF CONTRACT LAW 9-11 (1996).
18. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 423 (Edwin Cannon ed., Random House
1937) (1776).
19. Id. at 11-12, 22-29; see also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 342-47 (1971).
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Although many contracts presumably would be made and kept
even if the law did not enforce them, the law's enforcing them encour-
ages the making of more of them and increases the value of those that
are made by providing an important additional assurance that they
will be kept. For example, if the law did not enforce contracts, the
lawyer and the painter would have had to make and accept frequent
partial payments, preceded or followed by the lawyer inspecting the
just completed part of the painter's work, because neither could risk
investing much of his or her money or time without first knowing that
the other had done his or her part. And even then, the lawyer would
have no protection against defects that would not show up until
months or years later, such as the painter's use of inferior paint, and
the painter would have no protection against the lawyer's refusal to
make the payment that was to follow his completion of the work.
Thus, even if both did perform as promised, the costs of their perform-
ances would have been increased.
For all these reasons, it is extremely important that contracts be at
least generally enforced. Economic markets would eventually collapse
if they were not, and even in the short run they would operate much
less efficiently, and technological and industrial progress would be
greatly slowed.
B. The Institution of Credit and Finance: Contracts as
Property
Almost all the instruments of credit and finance are contracts.
Stocks, bonds, loans of all kinds, accounts of all kinds (bank accounts,
charge accounts, credit card accounts, money market accounts, etc.),
shares in joint ventures, partnerships, and "funds" (mutual funds,
pension funds, hedge funds, etc.) are all contracts. The English equity
courts had made contract rights generally assignable by the end of the
seventeenth century, the English law courts had followed suit by the
end of the eighteenth century, and the courts in both cases did so ex-
plicitly because the then emerging credit and finance systems re-
quired it. These systems required it because they required that
stocks, bonds, loans, etc. be capable of being bought and sold.20
If something can be bought and sold, it is property. The instru-
ments of credit and finance are therefore property. As such, any con-
tract right that can be assigned is property, whether it is an
instrument of credit and finance or not, and, as a rule, the law allows
any contract right to be assigned. 2 1 The United States Supreme Court
recognized in 1972 that even unassignable contract rights are prop-
erty for the purpose of protecting them against deprivation without




due process of law.22 Without contracts, the institutions of credit and
finance could not exist.
Ill. MEETING THE INSTITUTIONS' NEEDS
The expectation measure meets the needs of these institutions infour crucial respects: 1) it provides a remedy for every breach; 2) it
makes contracts enforceable as soon as they are made; 3) it compen-
sates the injured party for what he has lost, as the institution con-
cerned values that loss; and 4) it provides the right incentives fordecisions whether to breach. Neither of the other measures meetsthese institutions' needs in even one such respect. Each of these re-
spects is discussed in turn.
A. Providing a Remedy for Every Breach
There is no situation in which the expectation measure cannot be
used, whereas the law only allows either of the other measures to be
used if there was a so-called "material" or "total" breach23-a breach
serious enough to entitle the injured party to withhold her perform-
ance and cancel the contract.24 This limitation is not arbitrary. Aparty cannot incur a reliance loss unless the other party's materialbreach entitles him to cancel the contract, and he cancels it. This is sobecause as long as the contract is still in force, the breaching party
still owes the non-breaching party her performance, the receipt of
which was what he relied upon. Likewise, for a restitutional entitle-
ment, as long as the contract is still in force, the breaching party still
owes the non-breaching party her performance, which was the agreed
exchange for any benefits she may have received from him as a result
of her breach.
Moreover, even if the law allowed him to, a plaintiff could not use
either of the other measures to recover in the event of a partial breachbecause the notion of a reliance or a restitution recovery for a partialbreach is incoherent. To illustrate, assume that Contractor entersinto a typical contract with Owner to build a house for $100,000. As-
sume further that Contractor performs perfectly, but Owner pays her
only $95,000. In this instance, what is Contractor's reliance loss or
restitutional entitlement? There is no sensible answer to either ques-
22. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1972); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S.593, 601 (1972). Of course the Court has recognized that stocks, bonds and otherinstruments of credit and finance are property since long before 1972. The cases
cited extended this recognition to contract rights generally. The cases involved
employees' rights under contracts of employment, which are generally not
assignable.
23. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, §§ 12.16 (reliance measure), 12.20 (restitution
measure).
24. Id. § 8.15.
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tion, because the only loss she suffered was $5,000 of her expectancy.
The opposite situation also makes the point. Suppose that Owner
paid the $100,000 but Contractor left a defect that would cost Owner
$5,000 to correct. There is no sensible answer to what Owner's reli-
ance loss or restitutional entitlement is in this case either, although
his expectation loss of $5,000 is clear.
Sales of tangible property also serve to illustrate the point. Sup-
pose a sale of a shipload of crude oil warranted to have sulfur content
of no more than 0.50 percent tests at 0.54 percent. Suppose further
that the excess sulfur will cost the buyer $10,000 in additional refin-
ing costs to remove. Again, although the expectation loss is obviously
$10,000, there is no logical answer to the question of what is the reli-
ance loss or the restitutional entitlement. The inability of either the
reliance or the restitution measure to provide a recovery in cases of
only partial breach is extremely important, because neither of the
principal institutions in which contracts are used could function if
partial breaches were not reimbursed. Creditors could not recover
damages for late payments or for small payments that were never
made. Persons who had contracted for services to be performed could
not recover for small defects or only moderately incomplete perform-
ances. Buyers could not recover for defects in goods they had
accepted.
There is no reference to the restriction of the reliance and restitu-
tion measures to cases of total breach anywhere in the Fuller and Per-
due article. The authors were evidently unaware of it.
B. Making Contracts Enforceable as Soon as They Are Made
Although any contract is enforceable in principle as soon as it is
made, it is only enforceable as a practical matter if a breach would
give the injured party the right to recover enough damages to make it
worthwhile to sue. The expectation measure gives such a right imme-
diately, because it entitles each party to recover the profits she could
reasonably have expected to make if the contract were performed, and
if each party did not expect that she would make a profit if the other
performed, the contract would not have been made. 25
The reliance measure, however, does not make a contract enforcea-
ble by either party until she has relied on it to her substantial detri-
ment. Thus, either party could breach the contract without incurring
any liability at all until the other had relied on it to some extent, and
either could breach without incurring enough liability to make the
other's litigating worthwhile until the other had relied to a substantial
extent. Businesses could hardly function if damages were limited in
this way, because "deals" would never "close." For example, two busi-
25. See supra section II.A.
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nesses could negotiate for months over a joint venture before they fi-
nally reached agreement, but either one could still change its mind
and call the whole thing off or insist on renegotiating some point to
which it had already agreed, with impunity, if it did so before the
other had substantially relied. Transaction costs would be greatly in-
creased, because contracts would have to be renegotiated indefinitely
until one party finally "took the plunge" and substantially relied. Pro-
ductive efficiency would be reduced, because the pace of business
would be slowed. Neither party could rely on obtaining the profit he
expected from a contract until the other had fully performed, because
all that either could recover if the other party breached would be the
costs he had already incurred.
If the law were to limit injured parties to a restitution recovery, the
results would be even worse. Neither party would then be entitled to
a large enough recovery to make litigating worthwhile until the other
had benefited substantially at her expense. That would nearly always
take a long time to happen, and in the large majority of cases it would
never happen, unless the benefit was merely the receipt of a deposit or
a partial payment of the purchase price. Further, if the deposit or
partial payment was the benefit, getting it back would still leave the
injured party without her expected profits and the breaching party
without any penalty for having breached. Restitution recoveries pro-
vide no deterrence against breaching even in the relatively rare situa-
tions in which they do provide sufficient compensation to the injured
party.
C. Compensating the Injured Party for What He Has Lost
1. Damages Under the Expectation Measure
The expectation measure gives the injured party the value of his
bargain in every case. This is the value that the economic market
places on contracts, because it is in order to obtain this value that the
contracts which are used in economic markets are made. 26
The expectation measure also gives the injured party the value of
his property in the contract, which is necessary if the institutions of
credit and finance are to function as they should. Although particular
items of property may have sentimental, personal, aesthetic or other
noneconomic values, if an item has an economic value, that value is
the profit or other use an owner of it could expect to get from it, dis-
counted by the risk that the expectation will not be realized. For ex-
ample, the economic value of an apartment house is estimated by
reference to the profit (rents in excess of maintenance and operation
costs) an owner could expect to make from it, discounted by the risk
that the profit will not be realized. Likewise, the economic value of an
26. See supra section II.A.
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automobile is the use one could expect to get from it, discounted by the
risk that something will go wrong with it before its expected use is
realized. The instruments of credit or finance are valued the same
way because their values are their economic values. For example,
stocks are valued according to the profits the corporations are ex-
pected to make in the future, discounted by the risk that they will not
make them. If the stocks are not publicly traded, investors make
these estimates for themselves. If the stocks are publicly traded, the
buying and selling of them on the public markets based on these esti-
mates by investors, brokers, fund managers, speculators and others
determines the market prices at which they are bought and sold. The
expectation measure is the value of a contract right in a market econ-
omy, at least if the right is assignable, as it generally is.
2. Damages Under the Reliance Measure
a. The Shortfall
Recoveries under the reliance measure fall short of both institu-
tions' needs, because there are no such recoveries at all for partial
breaches, and even for total breaches the recoveries do not include the
expected profits or the costs incurred before the contract was made. 2 7
The last limitation is not only the law, it is inherent in the logic of the
measure, because the injured party cannot have incurred costs in reli-
ance on the contract unless he incurred them after the contract was
made. Fuller and Perdue were also evidently unaware of this limita-
tion on the use of the reliance measure, 28 just as they were of the limi-
tation of its use to cases of total breach.
This limitation makes the reliance measure especially inadequate,
because most of the costs of producing or marketing products in a
modern economy are incurred before the products are sold. For exam-
ple, a manufacturer will likely have incurred practically all the costs
of manufacturing the product before it sells it to a wholesaler or re-
tailer and will likely incur little if any additional costs thereafter. The
same will be the case for the wholesaler or retailer. The only costs
most retailers incur after making a sale are the costs of a plastic or
paper bag. Likewise for agricultural products, for which all the costs
of owning the land and of planting, tending and harvesting the crop
will generally have been incurred before the crop is sold. Even for
services contracts, in which the services are to be rendered after the
contract is made, the seller will at least have incurred its overhead
costs before the contract was made.
For the kinds of total breaches that can occur in the systems of
credit and finance, the reliance measure does even worse. If borrow-
27. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 12.16.
28. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 5, at 74.
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ers breached, lenders could recover only what they had lent, plus legal
interest, no matter what the agreed interest rate had been. If corpora-
tions breached, shareholders could recover only what the purchasers
of the shares had paid when the corporation first issued its shares,
plus legal interest, because as assignees of the original shareholders'
rights, all subsequent shareholders would have no more rights than
the original shareholders would have had.29 Options to buy long or
sell short would be worth no more than the paper they were printed
on.
b. Attempts to Prove this Shortfall Is Unimportant or Does
Not Exist
Fuller and Perdue claimed that the reliance measure provides as
large a recovery as the expectation measure does when lost opportuni-
ties are taken into account. Their reasoning was that the injured
party could have made the same profit on a contract with someone
else if he had not made it with the party who breached.3o They offered
the following example:
Physicians with an extensive practice often charge their patients the full office
call fee for broken appointments. Such a charge looks on the face of things
like a claim to the promised fee; it seems to be based on the "expectation inter-
est." Yet the physician making the charge will quite justifiably regard it as
compensation for the loss of the opportunity to gain a similar fee from a differ-
ent patient. This foregoing of other opportunities is involved to some extent in
entering most contracts, and the impossibility of subjecting this type of reli-
ance to any kind of measurement may justify a categorical rule granting the
value of the expectancy as the most effective way of compensating for such
losses. 3
1
Although the example seems to support the claim, it does not.
First, the breaches were total breaches-the patients did not show up
for their appointments-so the example does not include cases of only
partial breach, in which the reliance measure provides no recovery at
all. Second, although the example correctly describes the conse-
quences of a total breach by a buyer-patients are buyers of a physi-
cian's services-when the seller has only a limited supply of the thing
to sell, it does not include the consequences of a total breach by a
buyer when the seller has an unlimited supply of the thing to sell.
The latter kind of seller is much more common than the former in a
modern economy. (Physicians' supplies are limited because what they
sell is their time, at least as Fuller and Perdue pictured it.)
Dean William D. Hawkland was apparently the first to explain the
significance of this distinction, in a book published in 1958.32 When a
29. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 13, §§ 18.3, 18.17.
30. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 5, at 60.
31. Id.
32. HAWKLAND, supra note 11, at 153-54.
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buyer breaches a contract with a seller who has an unlimited supply of
something, the seller loses the profits he would have made on that
sale, and he does not recover them on other sales he makes thereafter,
because he would have made the other sales anyway, not having only
a limited supply of the thing. Therefore, he did not lose any opportu-
nities to sell to others when the first buyer breached. For example, an
automobile manufacturer can typically supply its dealers with as
many cars as they can sell. Therefore, if a buyer orders a car from a
dealer but refuses to accept it when the dealer tenders delivery of it,
the dealer loses the profits it would have made on the sale of that car.
This is so even if the dealer sells the same car for the same price to a
second buyer, because if the first buyer had accepted the car, the
dealer could have ordered another car from the manufacturer and sold
it to the second buyer. The same is generally the case today even for
sellers of services. For example, an air conditioning service can typi-
cally sell its services to as many customers as request them. It sched-
ules its calls for a few days ahead, and if an unusually large number of
requests come in, it merely schedules some of them for further ahead
than it usually would or puts its employees on overtime.
Melvin Aron Eisenberg and Robert Cooter tried to salvage some-
thing from Fuller and Perdue's claim by saying it would be correct in a
perfectly competitive market, because the sellers in such markets
have only limited supplies by definition. Eisenberg and Cooter also
pointed out, however, that the risk that the buyer with whom the
seller would otherwise have contracted would also have breached was
vanishingly small. They were willing to make this assumption them-
selves, apparently because they thought it would generally be the
fact.3 3 However, it almost certainly would not be the fact if con-
tracting parties were limited to recovering their reliance damages by
law. Under such a limitation, every buyer or seller with whom a seller
or buyer might otherwise have contracted would have had the same,
potentially enormous, economic incentive to breach as did the actual
buyer or seller. Suppose for example that a farmer contracted to sell
his bean crop to a food processor shortly before he planted it and that
by the time he harvested it, a drought in another part of the country
had sent the market price of beans up to twice the contract price. If
this farmer repudiated and sold his beans on the market instead,
would it be reasonable to assume that some other farmer with whom
the food processor might have contracted would not have done the
same? More likely, every farmer in the area with a similar contract
would also have repudiated. More likely still, under a law that limited
recoveries to the reliance measure, neither farmers nor food proces-
sors would ever have made such contracts in the first place, because
33. Eisenberg & Cooter, supra note 11, at 1445-49.
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both would have known that they could not enforce them if it turned
out to be to the other party's advantage to breach.
3. Damages Under the Restitution Measure
Recoveries under the restitution measure also fall short of the in-
stitutions' needs by not providing anything at all for partial breaches.
However, the question of their adequacies for meeting the institutions'
needs for total breaches is complicated by the existence of some in-
coherencies in the concept of the restitution measure itself. The mea-
sure in theory and the measure in practice are very different things.
a. The Restitution Measure in Theory
Fuller and Perdue, and the standard authorities, all define the res-
titution recovery as a recovery of a benefit the defendant obtained at
the plaintiffs expense as a result of the breach. 3 4 They all, therefore,
at some point also refer to it as avoiding "unjust enrichment."35 This
definition, however, is inconsistent with their implicit assumption
that the restitution measure provides something that the expectation
measure does not. For, if the benefit the defendant obtained was at
the plaintiffs expense, the expectation measure already includes it,
because it would then have been the plaintiffs benefit if the defendant
had not breached.
Take, for example, a contract for the sale of goods in a perfectly
competitive market such as a securities or commodities market. If the
market price at the time for delivery is higher than the contract price,
and the seller breaches by selling the goods at the higher market price
to someone else instead, the restitution measure is the difference be-
tween the contract and the market price. But this would also be the
expectation measure, because the buyer could have gotten this profit
himself if the seller had performed. Likewise, if the market price at
the time for delivery is lower than the contract price, and the buyer
breaches by buying the goods from someone else at the lower market
price, the restitution measure would here again be the difference be-
tween the contract and the market price. But again, this would also
be the expectation measure, because the seller could have gotten this
profit herself if the buyer had performed. Another example is the
buyer's right to the return of his deposit if the seller has materially
breached, which courts often call "restitutional,"36 although it could
just as logically be characterized as reliance (because the buyer made
34. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 5, 53-54; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 344(c) (1981) (Purposes of Remedies); CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 13,
§ 15.2; FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 12.1.
35. See sources cited supra note 34.
36. See, e.g., Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 285 N.E.2d 311, 313-14 (N.Y. 1972).
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it in reliance on the contract) or expectation (because it was a part of
the buyer's cost of performance of the contract, her performance being
paying the price).
The facts of Patterson v. Meyerhofer3 7 provide another illustration.
The defendant contracted to buy four parcels of land from the plaintiff
for a total price of $23,000 on the understanding that the plaintiff
would bid for them at a foreclosure auction. The plaintiffs profit (or
loss) would thus be the difference between what he could get them for
at auction and the $23,000 which the contract obligated the defendant
to pay him for them. However, the defendant attended the auction
herself and outbid the plaintiff, paying a total of $22,380 for the par-
cels. The court awarded the plaintiff $620 in expectation damages,
because this would have been his profit if the defendant had not
breached. That the $620 award also fits the description of restitu-
tional damages is obvious.
Thus, the restitution measure, by its own definition, never pro-
vides a recovery that the expectation measure would not, and the re-
covery it provides is often less. The interest it is supposed to protect is
therefore illusory; it does not exist apart from the expectation interest
and is always included in it.
b. The Restitution Measure in Practice
In practice, however, there is one situation in which the restitution
measure provides a larger recovery than the expectation (or reliance)
measure would. This is the case in which a material breach by one
party entitles the other to cease performing a contract on which he is
losing money-the "losing contract" case. United States ex. rel.
Coastal Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Algernon Blair, Inc.38 provides a well
known example of this factual scenario. The defendant, a general con-
tractor, had contracted with the plaintiff, one of its subcontractors, "to
perform certain steel erection and supply certain equipment in con-
junction with ... [the work]."39 The parties disputed who was to pay
the rent on the cranes the plaintiff was using. The plaintiff quit when
the defendant refused to pay the rent, after the plaintiff had com-
pleted twenty-eight percent of the work. Although the district court
found that the contract required the defendant to pay the rent, so that
the defendant was the party in breach, it declined to award any dam-
ages, because it also found that the plaintiff would have lost more
than the defendant owed it in damages if the plaintiff had completed
the work. The court of appeals, in an opinion written by Learned
Hand, reversed. It held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the
37. 97 N.E. 472 (N.Y. 1912).
38. 479 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1973).
39. Id. at 640.
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value of its work, which was to be measured by how much the defen-
dant would have had to pay another subcontractor to do it at the same
time and place, without regard to the contract price. 40 The measure of
recovery the court of appeals prescribed would provide more than the
expectation measure would have, because the expectation measure
was what the district court had used.
However, whatever one may think of its justice, this was not a res-
titution recovery, because the defendant had not benefited at the
plaintiffs expense. Rather, the plaintiff had benefited at the defen-
dant's expense. The plaintiff benefited by being excused from continu-
ing to work on a job upon which it was losing money. The benefit was
at the defendant's expense, because the defendant lost the right to
have the plaintiff complete the work for less than the work was worth.
Moreover, the amount of the recovery was arbitrary. By its logic, a
defendant has to pay more the later he breaches, unless he does not
breach until after the plaintiff has fully performed, in which case an
exception applies, and the plaintiff is relegated to his expectation
damages.41 And the amount the defendant has to pay bears no rela-
tion to how much, if anything, he may have benefited from the breach
or how much, if anything, his breach may have cost the plaintiff.
The rationale of decisions like Algernon Blair seems to be the fol-
lowing: The law only entitles a plaintiff to use the restitution measure
if the plaintiff canceled the contract after the defendant committed a
material breach. Canceling the contract leaves the defendant unjustly
enriched at the plaintiffs expense. The law of restitution-not the res-
titution measure of damages for breach-therefore entitles the plain-
tiff to recover from the defendant the value of this enrichment, the
measure of which is what the defendant would have had to pay some-
one else to provide the same services at the same time and place.4 2
Although this rationale is logical, it arbitrarily enriches the plaintiff
and punishes the defendant as just described, and it would do both of
these things with or without the exception for the plaintiff having
completed his performance by the time the defendant breached.
c. A Suggestion for Reducing the Unfairness and
Arbitrariness of the Restitution Measure in Practice
The plaintiffs in cases like Algernon Blair should recover for the
work they have done, at the contract rate, plus any incidental dam-
ages the breach may have caused them, and nothing more. This
would leave them better off than if their contracts had not been
breached, because they would not have to lose even more by complet-
40. Id. at 640-41.
41. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 13, § 15.6.




ing them, and it would punish the defendants for having breached by
depriving them of the benefit of the plaintiffs completing their per-
formances for less than the performances were worth. However, these
amounts of enrichment and punishment would be neither excessive
nor arbitrary, and they would be enough to prevent the breaching
party from benefiting at the injured party's expense.
D. Providing the Right Incentives for Decisions Whether to
Breach
A breach of contract is "Pareto efficient" if it benefits someone and
does not leave anyone worse off.4 3 Public policy favors such a breach,
because society as a whole benefits if some persons benefit and no one
is harmed. Only the expectation measure provides the right incen-
tives for making breaches Pareto efficient, because only this measure
leaves the party who did not breach neither worse nor better off than
if the contract had been performed. A measure that provided more
damages than the expectation measure would discourage some
breaches that would be efficient. A measure that provided less dam-
ages than the expectation measure would encourage some breaches
that would not be efficient. Therefore, both the reliance and the resti-
tution measures would not provide the right incentives for deciding
whether to breach, because they both generally provide less damages
than the expectation measure would-if they provide any damages at
all.
Although providing the right incentives for deciding whether to
breach is important, it is the least important of all the institutional
reasons for favoring the expectation measure, which is why I have put
it last. These incentives are irrelevant for most breaches, because
most breaches result from human weakness or miscalculation-care-
lessness, mistake, laziness, scheduling too many jobs to do at the same
time, etc.-rather than from a conscious decision to breach. Moreover,
usually nobody benefits from them, so that they could not have been
made efficiently even if the breaching party had made them intention-
ally. And even in most cases of intentional breach, the motivation is
not to use resources more profitably or more beneficially for someone
else, but to reduce one's costs by "cutting a corner" or cheating in some
other way, in the hope that the other party won't notice or won't do
anything about it if she does.
43. Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damages Measures, and Economic
Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273 (1970); RIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALY.
SIS OF LAw 13-14 (5th ed. 1998).
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E. The Legitimate Uses of the Restitution and Reliance
Measures in Contract Law
The law of restitution comes into play in contractual situations
whenever one party would otherwise be unjustly enriched at the
other's expense.4 4 These uses of the law of restitution, however, are to
be distinguished from the uses of restitution damages for breach, none
of which is legitimate, at least in my opinion.45
On the other hand, the reliance measure still has some legitimate
uses. Before describing them, however, I will distinguish a situation
in which although the reliance measure is frequently used, it is not
necessary, because the expectation measure already includes it. In-
jured parties who cannot prove their lost profits often use the reliance
measure to recover their costs. 4 6 There is no necessity of using this
measure in this situation, however, if-but only if-the costs were
costs of performance, because an injured party can recover his costs of
performance under the expectation measure, whether or not he can
prove his lost profits.47 Moreover, the expectation measure provides a
superior ground of recovery in this situation, because it entitles the
injured party to recover his costs whether or not he incurred them
after the contract was made; whereas the reliance measure is limited
to costs incurred after the contract was made. 48
This brings us to a situation for which the reliance measure is still
necessary to do justice. If the costs were not costs of performing the
contract, so that the expectation measure would not include them, the
reliance measure still entitles the plaintiff to recover these costs if he
incurred them after the contract was made. It is just that the injured
party recovers these costs, because if he had not expected the contract
to be profitable enough to cover them, he would not have made it. So,
he presumably would have made enough profits to cover these non-
performance costs if the other party had not breached. (In my opinion,
the expectation measure ought to be construed to include them by the
same logic, but I have never seen this done.) For example, if the plain-
tiff quit her job in reliance on a contract for a new job with the defen-
dant, which was employment-at-will or for an indeterminate duration,
and the defendant totally breached, the courts have generally allowed
the plaintiff to recover the compensation she lost by quitting and her
44. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, §§ 8.14 (applying when a party's rightful
termination of the contract because of the other party's total breach leaves the
first party unjustly enriched at the second party's expense), 9.6 (applying when
an unanticipated event makes a contract voidable).
45. See supra subsection III.C.3.
46. See, e.g., Security Stove & Mfg. Co. v. Am. Ry. Express Co., 51 S.W.2d 572 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1932); FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 12.16.
47. Beefy Trial, Inc. v. Beefy King Int'l, Inc., 267 So. 2d 853, 858-60 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1972) (Owen, J., dissenting); CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 13, § 14.9.
48. See supra subsection III.C.2.
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costs of searching for a new job under the reliance measure. 49 The
current definitions of the expectation measure would not include these
losses and costs, because they are neither expected profits nor costs of
performance.
The reliance measure is also useful in connection with the second
kind of defense of unilateral mistake, which applies when the mistake
was not so obvious that the other party should have noticed it.50 The
party who made the mistake is entitled to rescind the contract if cer-
tain conditions are satisfied, one of which is that the other party has
not relied on the mistake to his detriment.5 1 Although there are no
reported decisions on the issue, Melvin Aron Eisenberg has suggested
that the party who made the mistake should be entitled to rescind
even if the other party has relied to his detriment, provided the first
party pays the other's reliance damages.5 2 Eisenberg's suggestion is
so sensible that it will surely become part of the law at some point.
53
However, such reliance damages would not be for breach of contract,
they would be for compensating the other party for her detrimental
reliance on the mistake. As such, if one had to categorize them, they
would be considered damages for the commission of a tort.
54
IV. THE THREE INTERESTS THESIS OF FULLER
AND PERDUE
The Fuller and Perdue three interests thesis includes the following
errors in addition to those already identified.55
49. See, e.g., Dialist Co. v. Pulford, 42 Md. App. 173, 399 A.2d 1374 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1979); FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 12.16.
50. The other party is not permitted to make the contract by "snapping it up," if it is
that obvious. This is the first kind of unilateral mistake. CALAMARI & PERILLO,
supra note 13, § 9.27.
51. Id.
52. LON L. FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 699 (6th ed.
1996).
53. Indeed, CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 13, § 9.27 already states the law as
though it included Eisenberg's suggestion.
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. 1 (1965) (General Principles).
55. The errors already identified are: The restitution interest as Fuller and Perdue
defined it does not exist apart from the expectation interest, which already in-
cludes it, supra subsection III.C.3, and the reliance measure is not the equivalent
of the expectation measure if lost opportunities are taken into account, as Fuller
and Perdue maintained it was, for at least four reasons. First, it provides no
recovery at all for partial breaches, id. Second, even for total breaches, it does not
include the costs the plaintiff incurred before the contract was made, supra sub-
section III.C.2. Third, most breaches by far in a modern economy do not result in
lost opportunities, so that even if including lost opportunities would make a reli-
ance recovery equal an expectation recovery in some cases, such cases are rare,
id. Fourth, the reliance measure would not include lost opportunities in practice




Although there may be some very fundamental principles ofjustice
that are true in every time or place for all mankind, surely the mea-
sure of damages for breach of contract is not one of them. Rather, the
answer to the question of what such measure is the most just must
depend on the answers to other questions about the context in which
the measures are to play their roles. Examples of such questions in-
clude the following: How does the society concerned conceive of con-
tracts? What purposes do contracts in that society serve? In
particular, what purposes do damages for breach of contract in that
society serve? Yet, Fuller and Perdue began their article not by ask-
ing, but by answering the question of what purposes contract damages
serve, asserting that they serve to protect the three "interests" of resti-
tution, reliance and expectation.56 They then ranked these interests
in the order of importance in which I have just stated them because,
they claimed, "ordinary standards of justice" made this ranking "obvi-
ous."5 7 Although they later referred to a possible institutional justifi-
cation for the expectation measure, it was only to immediately dismiss
it as irrelevant on grounds of circularity.58
B. Using an Inappropriate Concept of Justice
Although Fuller and Perdue grounded their ranking of the three
interests on what they claimed were "obvious ... ordinary standards
of justice," they still sought to justify the ranking by demonstrating
that it was in accordance with Aristotle's concept of justice, which
was, in their paraphrase, "the maintenance of an equilibrium of goods
among members of society."59 They then had to characterize the mak-
ing and performing of contracts as departures from this equilibrium in
order to demonstrate this accordance.60
However, whatever validity Aristotle's concept of justice may have
had for the civilization of ancient Greece, in which men, women and
slaves each had their place, it is inappropriate for the modern age and
for a modern market economy in particular. The ideal now is not equi-
librium, but progress. People now are admired for obtaining more
goods for themselves, not condemned for it, provided they use only the
legitimate means that markets make available to them, including the
made the same contract presumably would have breached for the same reason
that the breaching party did, id.
56. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 5, at 53.
57. Id. at 56.
58. Id. at 59-60.
59. Id. at 56.
60. Id. at 56-57.
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making and performing of contracts. This is so because, as Adam
Smith put it, markets make individual gain serve the public good.6 1
C. Describing the Institutional Approach as Circular
In their article, Fuller and Perdue acknowledged that "[iin a soci-
ety in which credit has become a significant and pervasive institution,
it is inevitable that the expectancy created by an enforceable promise
should be regarded as a kind of property, and breach of the promise as
an injury to that property."6 2 However, they rejected the credit sys-
tem as an institutional basis for the expectation measure on the
ground that accepting it would be circular. They asked, "A promise
has present value, why? Because the law enforces it. 'The expec-
tancy,' regarded as a present value, is not the cause of legal interven-
tion but the consequence of it."63 They then went on to "reinforce"
their rejection by pointing to the fact that the law generally enforced
promises long before there was anything corresponding to a general
credit system.64
However, it is an error to think that justification is a matter of
cause. Even if it were a fact that contracts (i.e., enforceable promises)
have present value only because the law enforces them (i.e., because
the law awards expectation damages), that would not prevent the fact
that the credit system treats contracts as property from being an insti-
tutional justification for the expectation measure. For if the credit
system requires the use of the expectation measure to function effec-
tively, as Fuller and Perdue acknowledged it does, this is all that mat-
ters for justification purposes. It is irrelevant whether the credit
system or the expectation measure came first historically. Presuma-
bly, if English law was not already generally enforcing promises when
England first developed a credit system, the newly emergent institu-
tional powers would have quickly seen to it that the law was changed
to generally enforce promises. Or, if English law was already gener-
ally enforcing promises when England first developed a credit system,
the credit system would immediately have made use of the law be-
cause the credit system required the law in order to function effec-
tively. The credit system would be an institutional foundation of the
law either way.
Asking which came first, an institution or a law it requires, is a
little like asking which came first, the chicken or the egg. The histori-
cal fact is most likely to be that they developed together. This was
true with Anglo-American contract law and the institution of the mar-
61. See supra section II.A.
62. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 5, at 59.
63. Id. at 59-60.
64. Id. at 60.
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ket economy. Although an Anglo-American law of contract already ex-
isted in the eighteenth century, it was rudimentary. Contracting was
time-consuming, and legal technicalities made the outcome of contract
litigation uncertain. Moreover, contractually set prices and other
terms of sale ran the risk of being illegal for conflicting with the so-
called "duties of the common callings," the prices and other terms of
which were set by law, at least in principle. The English and Ameri-
can courts did not begin the development of the contract law we now
generally call "classical contract" until late in the eighteenth century,
which, not merely by coincidence, is also the time at which historians
mark the beginning of market economies in England and the United
States.65
D. Asserting that Contracts Have Present Value Only
Because the Law Enforces Them
In their article, Fuller and Perdue wrote that "[a] promise has pre-
sent value, why? Because the law enforces it."66 Although it is cer-
tainly true that contracts generally have greater present values
because the law enforces them than they would have if the law did not
enforce them, it does not follow that if the law did not enforce them,
they would have no present value. All sorts of other factors-honor,
reputation, reciprocity ("I will keep my promises to you if you keep
yours to me."), and simple honesty, for example-also contribute. The
debts that underdeveloped countries owe to lenders in developed coun-
tries are a current example. These debts total in the trillions of dol-
lars, and of course the lenders to whom they are owed would never
have lent the money in the first place if they did not think the loans
would be valuable. Yet there are no courts with the power to compel
these countries to pay their debts, and during the international debt
crisis of the 1980s, there was apprehension that some countries would
unilaterally renounce their contracts. 67 Of course many of these loans
are now valued at less than their face values, but they still have some
value-trillions of dollars of it. Fuller and Perdue's assertion that
"[t]he expectancy, regarded as a present value, is not the cause of legal
intervention but the consequence of it,"68 is false, as this example
demonstrates.
65. SLAWSON, supra note 2, at 9-11.
66. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 5, at 59.
67. See, e.g., Steven M. Cohen, Give Me Equity or Give Me Debt: Avoiding a Latin
American Debt Revolution, 10 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 89, 98-99 (1988).
68. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 5, at 59-60.
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E. Identifying the General Enforceability of Promises as the
Legal Basis for the Credit System
It was not, as Fuller and Perdue maintained, the general enforce-
ability of promises that made contract rights property,6 9 rather, as ex-
plained earlier, it was the general assignability of contract rights.7 0
F. Asserting that Expectation Damages Are Generally
Easier to Prove than Reliance Damages
Fuller and Perdue's final conclusion was that, although there were
no good reasons for protecting the expectation interest, a good reason
for using the expectation measure of damages as the norm was that it
generally results in the same recovery as the reliance measure would
and is easier to prove.7 1 I have already explained why the two mea-
sures do not generally result in the same recovery. 72 I will now ex-
plain why the expectation measure is also not generally easier to
prove.
As even first year law students now learn, the very opposite is the
case: Reliance damages are always easier to prove than expectation
damages. Reliance damages consist of the costs the plaintiff incurred
after the contract was made and before the defendant breached. Ex-
pectation damages consist of these costs, plus all the other costs the
plaintiff incurred, plus the profit the plaintiff would have made if the
defendant had not breached. Thus, proving expectation damages is
always more difficult, because it always requires proving the reliance
damages and more.
It is for this reason that the most common use of the reliance mea-
sure is to obtain a recovery when the plaintiff cannot prove the profits
he would have made if the defendant had not breached. 73 For exam-
ple, in Security Stove & Manufacturing Co. v. American Railways Ex-
press Co. ,74 the defendant contracted to deliver twenty-one packages
to Atlantic City, New Jersey, in time for the plaintiff to use their con-
tents to construct an exhibit of its oil burning furnace at a convention
of the American Gas Association. The defendant failed to deliver one
of the packages that contained a crucial part until the convention was
over. The court awarded the plaintiff its reliance damages on the
ground that a plaintiff is entitled to them if he cannot prove his expec-
tation damages. 75
69. Id. at 60.
70. See supra section II.B.
71. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 5, at 60-62.
72. See supra sections III.A-III.B.
73. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 12.16 (making the same point).
74. 51 S.W.2d 572 (Mo. Ct. App. 1932).
75. Id. at 577.
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V. CONCLUSION
The expectation measure, and only it, meets the needs of the prin-
cipal institutions in a modern market economy in which contracts are
used, in four critical respects. It provides a remedy for every breach.
It makes contracts enforceable as soon as they are made. It compen-
sates the injured party for what he has lost, as the institution con-
cerned values that loss. And it provides the right incentives for
decisions whether to breach. Neither of the other measures meets
these institutions' needs in even one of these respects. These institu-
tions would collapse if damages for breach of contract were limited to
either of the other measures. The three interests thesis is much too
flawed to be of use for comparing the merits of the three measures.
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APPENDIX
Excerpts from L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The
Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 176
(starred numbers indicate original pagination)
[53*] It is convenient to distinguish three principal purposes which
may be pursued in awarding contract damages. These purposes, and
the situations in which they become appropriate, may be stated briefly
as follows:
First, the plaintiff has in reliance on the promise of the defendant
conferred some value on the defendant. The defendant fails to per-
form his promise. The court may force the defendant to disgorge the
value [54*] he received from the plaintiff. The object here may be
termed the prevention of gain by the defaulting promisor at the ex-
pense of the promisee; more briefly, the prevention of unjust enrich-
ment. The interest protected may be called the restitution interest.
For our present purposes it is quite immaterial how the suit in such a
case be classified, whether as contractual or quasi-contractual,
whether as a suit to enforce the contract or as a suit based upon a
rescission of the contract. These questions relate to the superstruc-
ture of the law, not to the basic policies with which we are concerned.
Secondly, the plaintiff has in reliance on the promise of the defen-
dant changed his position. For example, the buyer under a contract
for the sale of land has incurred expense in the investigation of the
seller's title, or has neglected the opportunity to enter other contracts.
We may award damages to the plaintiff for the purpose of undoing the
harm which his reliance on the defendant's promise has caused him.
Our object is to put him in as good a position a he was in before the
promise was made. The interest protected in this case may be called
the reliance interest.
Thirdly, without insisting on reliance by the promisee or enrich-
ment of the promisor, we may seek to give the promisee the value of
the expectancy which the promise created. We may in a suit for spe-
cific performance actually compel the defendant to render the prom-
ised performance to the plaintiff, or, in a suit for damages, we may
make the defendant pay the money value of this performance. Here
our object is to put the plaintiff in as good a position as he would have
occupied had the defendant performed his promise. The interest pro-
tected in this case we may call the expectation interest.
[56*] It is obvious that the three "interests" we have distinguished
do not present equal claims to judicial intervention. It may be as-
76. 46 YALE L.J. 52, 53-62 (1936) (footnotes omitted). Reprinted with permission
from the Yale Law Journal.
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sumed that ordinary standards of justice would regard the need for
judicial intervention as decreasing in the order in which we have
listed the three interests. The "restitution interest," involving a com-
bination of unjust impoverishment with unjust gain, presents the
strongest case for relief. If, following Aristotle, we regard the purpose
of justice as the maintenance of an equilibrium of goods among mem-
bers of society, the restitution interest presents twice as strong a
claim to judicial intervention as the reliance interest, since if A not
only causes B to lose one unit but appropriates that unit to himself,
the resulting discrepancy between A and B is not one unit but two.
On the other hand, the promisee who has actually relied on the
promise, even though he may not thereby have enriched the promisor,
certainly presents a more pressing case for relief than the promisee
who merely demands satisfaction for his disappointment in not get-
ting what was promised him. In passing from compensation for
change of position to compensation for loss of expectancy we pass, to
use Aristotle's terms again, from the realm of corrective justice to that
of distributive justice. The law no longer seeks merely to heal a dis-
turbed status quo, but to bring into being a new situation. It ceases to
act defensively or restoratively, and assumed a more active role. With
the transition, the [57*] justification for legal relief loses its self-evi-
dent quality. It is as a matter of fact no easy thing to explain why the
normal rule of contract recovery should be that which measures dam-
ages by the value of the promised performance. Since this "normal
rule" throws its shadow across our whole subject it will be necessary to
examine the possible reasons for its existence. It may be said
parenthetically that the discussion which follows, though directed pri-
marily to the normal measure of recovery where damages are sought,
also has relevance to the more general question, why should a promise
which has not been relied on ever be enforced at all, whether by a
decree of specific performance or by an award of damages?
WHY SHOULD THE LAW EVER PROTECT THE EXPECTATION INTEREST?
Perhaps the most obvious answer to this question is one which we
may label "psychological."... Whether or not he has actually changed
his position because of the promise, the promisee has formed an atti-
tude of expectancy such that a breach of the promise causes him to feel
that he has been "deprived" of something which was "his." Since this
sentiment is a relatively uniform one, the law has no occasion to go
back of it. It accepts it as a datum and builds its rule about it.
The difficulty with this explanation is that the law does in fact go
back of the sense of injury which the breach of a promise engen-
ders. [58*] No legal system attempts to invest with juristic sanction all
promises. Some rule or combination of rules effects a sifting out for
enforcement of those promises deemed important enough to society to
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justify the law's concern with them.... Therefore, though it may be
assumed that the impulse to assuage disappointment is one shared by
those make and influence the law, this impulse can hardly be re-
garded as the key which solves the whole problem of the protection
accorded by the law to the expectation interest.
A second possible explanation for the rule protecting the expec-
tancy may be found the much-discussed "will theory" of contract law.
This theory views the contracting parties as exercising, so to speak, a
legislative power, so that the legal enforcement of a contract becomes
merely an implementing by the state of a kind of private law already
established by the parties. ...
... This attitude finds a natural application to promises to pay a
definite sum of money. But certainly as to most [59*] types of con-
tracts it is vain to expect from the will theory a ready-made solution
for the problem of damages.
A third and more promising solution of our difficulty lies in an eco-
nomic or institutional approach .... In a society in which credit has
become a significant and pervasive institution, it is inevitable that the
expectancy created by an enforceable promise should be regarded as a
kind of property, and breach of the promise as an injury to that
property. ...
The most obvious objection which can be made to the economic or
institutional explanation is that it involves a petitio principii. A prom-
ise has present value, why? Because the law enforces it. "The expec-
tancy,"[60*] regarded as a present value, is not the cause of legal
intervention but the consequence of it. This objection may be rein-
forced by a reference to legal history. Promises were enforced long
before there was anything corresponding to a general system of
"credit," and recovery was from the beginning measured by the value
of the promised performance, the "agreed price." It may therefore be
argued that the "credit system," when it finally emerged was itself in
large part built on the foundations of juristic development which pre-
ceded it.
The view just suggested asserts the primacy of law over economics;
it sees law not as the creature but as the creator of social institutions.
The shift of emphasis thus implied suggests the possibility of a fourth
explanation for the law's protection of the unrelied-on expectancy,
which we may calljuristic. This explanation would seek a justification
for the normal rule of recovery in some policy consciously pursued by
courts and other lawmakers ....
What reasons can be advanced? In the first place, even if our inter-
est were confined to protecting promisees against an out-of-pocket
loss, it would still be possible to justify the rule granting the value of




It is a cure for these losses in the sense that it offers the measure of
recovery most likely to reimburse the plaintiff for the (often very nu-
merous and very difficult to prove) individual acts and forbearances
which make up his total reliance on the contract. If we take into ac-
count "gains prevented" by reliance, that is, losses involved in forego-
ing the opportunity to enter other contracts, the notion that the rule
protecting the expectancy is adopted as the most effective means of
compensating for detrimental reliance seems not at all far-fetched.
Physicians with an extensive practice often charge their patients the
full office call fee for broken appointments. Such a charge looks on the
face of things like a claim to the promised fee; it seems to be based on
the "expectation interest." Yet the physician making the charge will
quite justifiably regard it as compensation for the loss of the opportu-
nity to gain a similar fee from a different patient. This foregoing of
other opportunities is involved to some extent in entering most con-
tracts, and the impossibility of subjecting this type of reliance to any
kind of measurement may justify a categorical rule granting the value
of the expectancy as the most effective way of compensating for such
losses. [61*]
In seeking justification for the rule granting the value of the expec-
tancy there is no need, however, to restrict ourselves by the assump-
tion, hitherto made, that the rule can only be intended to cure or
prevent the losses caused by reliance. A justification can be developed
from a less negative point of view. It may be said that there is not
only a policy in favor of preventing and undoing the harms resulting
from reliance, but also a policy in favor of promoting and facilitating
reliance on business agreements. As in the case of the stoplight ordi-
nance we are interested not only in preventing collisions but in speed-
ing traffic. Agreements can accomplish little, either for their makers
or for society, unless they are made the basis for action. When busi-
ness agreements are not only made but are also acted on, the division
of labor is facilitated, goods find their way to the places where they are
most needed, and economic activity is generally stimulated. These ad-
vantages would be threatened[62*] by any rule which limited legal
protection to the reliance interest. Such a rule would in practice tend
to discourage reliance. The difficulties in proving reliance and sub-
jecting it to pecuniary measurement are such that the business man
knowing, or sensing, that these obstacles stood in the way of judicial
relief would hesitate to rely on a promise in any case where the legal
sanction was of significance to him. To encourage reliance we must
therefore dispense with its proof. For this reason it has been found
wise to make recovery on a promise independent of reliance, both in
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the sense that in some cases the promise is enforced though not relied
on (as in the bilateral business agreement) and in the sense that re-
covery is not limited to the detriment incurred in reliance.
